An Eavesdropping And Jamming Dilemma When The Adversary Might Be Subjective

Wireless networks are susceptible to malicious attacks, especially those involving jamming and eavesdropping. To maintain secure and reliable communication under such threats, different anti-adversary strategies have been proposed to mitigate the adversary impact. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated adversary with the dual capability of either eavesdropping passively or jamming any ongoing transmission, and investigate a new aspect to consider when designing an anti-adversary strategy: how uncertainty about whether the rival is rational or subjective could impact the strategies. To model such uncertainty, we formulate a Bayesian Prospect Theory (BPT) extension of the game between a user and an adversary who chooses between an eavesdropping attack and a jamming attack against the user. Meanwhile the user chooses against which of the threats to apply the corresponding best response strategy. Uniqueness of the BPT equilibrium strategies is proven and they are found in closed form.