Economic Incentives to Increase Security in the Internet: The Case for Insurance

Entities in the Internet, ranging from individuals and enterprises to service providers, face a broad range of epidemic risks such as worms, viruses, and botnet-driven attacks. Those risks are interdependent risks, which means that the decision by an entity to invest in security and self-protect affects the risk faced by others (for example, the risk faced by an individual decreases when its providers increases its investments in security). As a result of this, entities tend to invest too little in self-protection, relative to the socially efficient level, by ignoring benefits conferred on by others. In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentives to entities in the Internet so that they invest at a socially e fficient level. In particular, we find that insurance is a powerful inc entive mechanism which pushes agents to invest in self-protection. Thus, insurance increases the level of self-protection, and therefore the level of security, in the Internet. As a result, we believe th at insurance should be considered as an important component of risk management in the Internet. I. I NTRODUCTION